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UNITED STATES v. CHAMBERS:  
NONCUSTODIAL ESCAPES DO NOT 
ALWAYS CONSTITUTE A VIOLENT 
CRIME FOR PURPOSES OF THE 
ARMED CAREER CRIMINAL ACT 
JIN WOO OH* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A Seventh Circuit panel, on January 9, 2007, affirmed a district 
court’s judgment that Deondery Chambers’s conviction under Illinois 
law for felonious escape1 constituted a violent felony for purposes of 
sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act 
(ACCA).2 The district court convicted Chambers for felonious escape 
because he failed to report to a penal institution for weekend 
confinement following his felony conviction.3 Chambers claimed that 
the court should differentiate between noncustodial escape and 
custodial escape, with only the latter presenting a “serious potential 
risk of physical injury to another”4 sufficient to constitute a violent 
felony for purposes of sentencing enhancement,5 and argued that his 
failure to report did not endanger anyone so it should not be 
considered a violent felony.6 
 
 * 2010 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. Illinois defines felonious escape not only as “intentionally escap[ing] from any penal 
institution or from the custody of an employee of that institution,” but also as “knowingly 
fail[ing] to report to a penal institution or to report for periodic imprisonment.” 720 Ill. Comp. 
Stat. Ann. 5/31-6 (West 2008). 
 2. United States v. Chambers (Chambers I), 473 F.3d 724, 726 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 3. Id. at 725. 
 4. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2000). 
 5. Chambers I, 473 F.3d at 726. 
 6. See Brief of the Petitioner at 2, 6, United States v. Chambers, No.06-11206 (7th Cir. 
July 30, 2008) [hereinafter Petitioner’s Brief] (arguing that “the mere failure to report for 
periodic confinement” does not qualify as a violent felony and explaining how Chambers has 
disputed likewise). 
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The Seventh Circuit acknowledged the virtue of categorizing 
escapes because noncustodial escapes, such as walkaways or failures 
to report, seem less likely to lead to violence than custodial escapes, 
such as prison breaks.7 Nonetheless, the court followed its recent 
precedents categorizing all felonious escapes as violent felonies and 
held that Chambers’s escape, regardless of its nature, constituted a 
violent felony pursuant to the ACCA.8 
The Seventh Circuit denied Chambers’s petition for rehearing en 
banc on February 16, 2007,9 and on October 6, 2008, the United States 
Supreme Court granted Chambers’s petition for a writ of certiorari.10 
On January 13, 2009, the Supreme Court issued its opinion, holding 
that a “failure to report” escape, as in Chambers’s case, is not a 
“violent felony” within the terms of the ACCA.11 
II.  FACTS 
Deondery Chambers, on May 31, 2005, was charged with being a 
felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).12 The 
government sought to enhance Chambers’s sentence by asserting that 
Chambers had three prior convictions for violent felonies, which 
qualified him as an armed career criminal under the ACCA.13 
Chambers’s three convictions are the following: a July 1998 conviction 
for robbery and aggravated battery, a February 1999 conviction for 
escape, and a June 1999 conviction for drug possession and 
distribution near public housing.14 Part of his sentence for the first 
conviction included reporting to the Jefferson County, Illinois, jail for 
eleven weekends of confinement.15 Chambers, however, failed to 
report on four occasions,16 resulting in his February 1999 conviction 
 
 7. See Chambers I, 473 F.3d at 726 (explaining that there is “no impropriety in dividing 
escapes, for purposes of ‘crime of violence’ classification, into jail or prison breaks on the one 
hand and walkaways, failures to report, and failures to return, on the other”). 
 8. Id. 
 9. United States v. Chambers (Chambers II), No. 06-2405, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 5280, at 
*2 (7th Cir. Feb. 16, 2007). 
 10. United States v. Chambers (Chambers I), 473 F.3d 724 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 
S. Ct. 2046 (mem.) (U.S. Apr. 21, 2008) (No. 06-11206). 
 11. United States v. Chambers (Chambers III), 129 S. Ct. 687, 689 (2009). 
 12. Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 6, at 3, 6. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 3. 
 16. Id. 
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for felonious escape under Illinois law.17 Chambers pled guilty to the 
charge.18 
At the sentencing hearing, Chambers did not dispute that the first 
two convictions qualified as predicate offenses under the ACCA.19 As 
to the third conviction, however, Chambers asserted that his failure-
to-report escape did not present the level of risk required to 
constitute a violent felony triggering sentencing enhancement.20 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The ACCA provides for enhanced sentencing of a defendant who 
is convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 
§ 922(g) and who has three previous convictions for serious drug 
offenses or violent felonies.21 Congress intended that the ACCA target 
“career criminals”22 who commit serious crimes as “their means of 
livelihood”23 and it requires a minimum fifteen year prison sentence.24 
The ACCA defines “violent felony” as “any crime punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, or any act of juvenile 
delinquency involving the use or carrying of a firearm, knife, or 
destructive device that would be punishable by imprisonment . . . if 
committed by an adult.”25 Furthermore, the ACCA requires that the 
crime “ha[ve] as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use 
of physical force against the person of another”26 or “[be a] burglary, 
arson, or extortion, involv[ing] use of explosives, or otherwise 
involv[ing] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical 
injury to another.”27 
A circuit split developed regarding whether every escape, 
regardless of its nature, categorically qualified as a violent felony 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 6. 
 20. Id. at 6, 15 (disputing that failure-to-repot escape is not a violent felony because it lacks 
“purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct”). 
 21. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2000). 
 22. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 587 (1990). 
 23. Id. 
 24. § 924(e). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
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pursuant to the ACCA.28 The federal circuits’ debates focused on 
whether all escapes “otherwise involve[] conduct that presents a 
serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”29 
A. Escape as a Violent Felony in the Seventh Circuit 
The Seventh Circuit primarily based its holding in Chambers’s 
case on its two prior cases—United States v. Bryant30 and United States 
v. Golden31—in which the Circuit dealt with the identical issue of 
whether a noncustodial escape involving the failure to report to a 
penal institution constituted a violent felony pursuant to the ACCA. 
In both cases, the defendants faced an ACCA sentencing 
enhancement, with failure-to-report escape cited as one of their 
predicate offenses. 
The defendant in Bryant was convicted of felonious escape for 
failing to return on schedule to a halfway house.32 The defendant 
objected to the classification of his escape as a violent felony for 
purposes of a sentencing enhancement.33 He requested that the court 
adopt a fact-specific approach in deciding whether his noncustodial 
escape, which involved merely a failure to return, should be treated as 
a violent felony.34 
The court, however, adopted a categorical approach to the issue—
examining only the fact of conviction and the statutory elements of 
the crime, but not the underlying facts—to determine that the 
defendant’s felonious escape constituted a violent felony.35 The court 
based its decision on Taylor v. United States,36 in which the Supreme 
Court rejected a fact-specific, case-by-case approach, and instead 
offered a categorical approach for determing if an offense qualified as 
a violent felony for purposes of the “otherwise involves . . .” language 
of the ACCA,37 herein referred to as the “residual provision.”38 
 
 28. See United States v. Chambers (Chambers I), 473 F.3d 724, 726 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(explaining that except for the D.C. and the Ninth Circuits, the federal circuit courts have held 
that every escape qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA). 
 29. Id. (emphasis added). 
 30. United States v. Bryant, 310 F.3d 550 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 31. United States v. Golden, 466 F.3d 612 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 32. Bryant, 310 F.3d at 552. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 553. 
 35. Id. at 554. 
 36. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990). 
 37. Bryant, 310 F.3d at 554. 
 38. James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 197 (2007). 
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Applying the categorical approach, the Bryant court held that all 
escapes—both custodial and noncustodial—fall within the category of 
crimes that involve the possibility of a violent confrontation and 
therefore qualify as violent felonies.39 To justify treating every escape 
categorically as a violent felony, the Bryant court explained that to 
hold some escapes as involving less risk of violence because they are 
closer to “failure to return” than “escape” invites difficult line-
drawing problems that the Supreme Court sought to avoid by 
adopting the categorical approach in Taylor.40 
The Golden case, likewise, involved a noncustodial escape and 
addressed the issue of whether the failure to report to a penal 
institution falls within the residual clause so as to qualify as a violent 
felony.41 Again, the Golden court applied the categorical approach and 
held that escape crimes, as a category, involve the possibility of violent 
confrontation and therefore constitute violent felonies.42 According to 
the Golden court, the fact that noncustodial escapes, such as the 
failure to report, involve passive inaction rather than the deliberate 
act of breaking out of prison makes no difference—they all qualify as 
a violent felony.43 
B. Escape as a Violent Felony in the Ninth and D.C. Circuits 
When first addressing sentencing enhancements for escape crimes, 
neither the D.C. Circuit nor the Ninth Circuit rejected the categorical 
approach44 in favor of the fact-specific approach, but both circuits 
refused to find that every escape constitutes a violent felony for 
sentencing enhancement purposes. For instance, the D.C. Circuit did 
not reject the classification of all escapes as violent felonies but did 
express reluctance to apply the categorical approach.45 Faced with a 
custodial escape, the D.C. Circuit simply avoided the issue, noting that 
 
 39. Bryant, 310 F.3d at 554. 
 40. Id. 
 41. United States v. Golden, 466 F.3d 612, 612 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 42. Id. at 614–15. 
 43. Id. at 614. 
 44. Again, the categorical approach examines the fact that a defendant was convicted for a 
particular felony and the statutory elements of the crime, but not the underlying facts, when 
determining whether the felony constitutes a violent felony. Bryant, 310 F.3d at 554. 
 45. See United States v. Thomas, 333 F.3d 280, 282–83 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (explaining that 
although under the categorical approach, “every offense of escape” involves possible risk of 
injury to others, the court is “not certain that [it is] prepared to go so far,” but need not decide 
in that particular case whether the categorical approach is the appropriate framework for 
deciding whether a crime constitutes a violent felony). 
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it need not decide between the categorical approach and the fact-
specific approach because, whichever approach was applied, a 
custodial escape qualifies as a violent felony.46 The Ninth Circuit, on 
the other hand, applied the categorical approach to hold, contrary to 
the Seventh Circuit, that not every escape per se presents a serious 
potential risk of physical injury to another sufficient to qualify as a 
violent felony. The Ninth Circuit held instead that noncustodial 
escapes do not implicate the same risks of physical violence as 
custodial escapes and therefore should not be treated as a violent 
crime sufficient to trigger the ACCA sentencing enhancements.47 
The D.C. Circuit, in United States v. Thomas, expressed reluctance 
in applying the categorical approach, because it was “not certain”48 
that every escape, including noncustodial escapes such as a walkaway, 
involves sufficient risk to others to qualify as a violent felony under 
the ACCA.49 Rather than addressing the uncertainty by creating a 
separate category for noncustodial escapes, the D.C. Circuit 
considered the categorical approach itself to be problematic.50 It 
asserted that the categorical analysis—as far as escape crimes are 
concerned—creates arbitrary classifications without regard to the 
actual risk of violence that a crime presents.51 Thus, the D.C. Circuit 
challenged the categorical approach as the appropriate framework for 
determining if a crime constitutes a violent felony.52 But it avoided 
reaching the issue by indicating that the case before it involved a 
custodial escape and therefore constituted a violent felony under 
either the categorical or fact-specific approach.53 
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected in United States v. 
Piccolo a fact-specific approach when deciding whether a felonious 
escape constituted a violent felony for purposes of sentencing 
enhancement, and instead adopted the categorical approach outlined 
 
 46. Id. at 283. 
 47. United States v. Piccolo, 441 F.3d 1084, 1090 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 48. Thomas, 333 F.3d at 282 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 49. Id. at 282–83. 
 50. See id. at 282 (explaining that the categorical approach “proves too much,” making the 
court “reluctant to adopt” it). 
 51. See id. at 283 (concluding that a “prisoner not returning to a half-way house or 
sneaking away from an unguarded position in the night may not inherently create a risk of harm 
to others”). 
 52. See id. at 282 (concluding that the court is “reluctant to adopt the categorical 
approach,” because one could argue that “under the approach . . . all crimes become crimes of 
violence”). 
 53. Id. at 283. 
DO NOT DELETE 4/15/2009 3:56:03 PM 
2009] UNITED STATES V. CHAMBERS 369 
in Taylor.54 The court’s categorical analysis of escape crimes, however, 
differed from that of the Seventh Circuit in that it treated custodial 
and noncustodial escapes as two separate categories.55 It held that 
convictions under the escape statute, which include both custodial and 
noncustodial escapes, “sweep too broadly”56 to be classified into a 
single category of violent felonies.57 The court explained that 
noncustodial escapes, which “do not pose an automatic risk of 
danger,”58 do not present the level of risk required to qualify as 
violent felonies and should be classified as a separate category of 
nonviolent crimes.59 
IV.  HOLDING 
Following its prior analysis in United States v. Bryant and in United 
States v. Golden that both custodial and noncustodial escapes are 
violent crimes, the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Chambers 
applied the categorical approach and held that Chambers’s 
noncustodial, felonious escape was a violent felony.60 The court noted, 
however, that for purposes of violent felony classification, “there 
would be no impropriety in dividing escapes”61 into custodial escapes 
on the one hand and noncustodial escapes on the other.62 The court 
criticized the categorical analysis of Bryant and Golden that lumped 
all escapes together as a single category of violent felonies.63 The court 
 
 54. United States v. Piccolo, 441 F.3d 1084, 1086 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Taylor v. United 
States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990)). 
 55. See id. at 1088–89 (explaining that although the categorical approach is the 
“appropriate framework for determining whether a current offense constitutes a crime of 
violence,” it is also the case that “the circumstances apparent in a walkaway escape are of an 
entirely different order of magnitude than escapes from jails and prisons”). 
 56. Id. at 1090. 
 57. See id. at 1089 (rejecting the description of an escape as a “powder keg, which may or 
may not explode into violence . . . but which always has the serious potential to do so” as 
“prov[ing] too much”). 
 58. Id. at 1088. 
 59. See id. at 1089-90 (upholding the categorical approach as “the appropriate framework” 
for analysis and deciding that noncustodial escapes do not necessarily involve the level of risk 
required to qualify as violent felonies). 
 60. See United States v. Chambers (Chambers I), 473 F.3d 724, 726 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(adhering to precedent that refused to carve out noncustodial from custodial escape, thereby 
holding that all felonious escapes categorically give rise to the level of risk required to qualify 
any felonious escape as a violent felony). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See id. (“We shall adhere to the precedents for now. But it is an embarrassment to the 
law when judges base decisions of consequence on conjectures, in this case a conjecture as to the 
DO NOT DELETE 4/15/2009 3:56:03 PM 
370 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 4:363 
expressed its reluctance in making such a categorization based on 
“conjectures”64 about the potential physical risk to others, when 
noncustodial escapes such as walkways and failures to report seem 
less violence-prone than custodial escapes such as prison breaks.65 
To make its point clear, the Seventh Circuit discussed a Tenth 
Circuit case—United States v. Gosling—that many subsequent cases 
cite for its categorical analysis of escape crimes. In Gosling, the Tenth 
Circuit stated that “every escape scenario is a powder keg, which may 
or may not explode into violence and result in physical injury to 
someone at any given time, but which always has the serious potential 
to do so.”66 Many courts have used this language in their categorical 
analyses of escape crimes to justify categorizing noncustodial escapes 
and custodial escapes as violent felonies.67 The Chambers court 
criticized the adoption of the Gosling language for failing to recognize 
that Gosling only pertains to custodial escapes and “should not be 
treated as authoritative in a case that does not involve a jail break.”68 
Despite its criticism of the categorical analysis used in Bryant and 
Golden, the Chambers court adhered to its precedents.69 The court 
described its holding as shrinking away from overruling Golden, 
which was only recently decided relative to Chambers and which had 
“overwhelming support in the decisions of the other circuits.”70 The 
court, nevertheless, expressed its doubt concerning the precedents by 
appealing to the Sentencing Commission as well as scholars and 
criminal justice institutes for research on the frequency of violence in 
noncustodial escapes versus custodial escapes to determine whether 
noncustodial escapes were properly categorized as violent felonies.71 
The court asserted that if the frequency of violence in noncustodial 
escapes could be shown to be very low, it “would provide a powerful 
reason to reexamine Bryant and Golden.”72 
 
possible danger of physical injury posed by criminals who fail to show up to begin serving their 
sentences or fail to return from furloughs or to halfway houses.” (emphasis added)). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 726–27 (citing United States v. Gosling, 39 F.3d 1140, 1142 (10th Cir. 1994)). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 727. 
 69. Id. at 726. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See id. at 727 (holding that “more research will be needed to establish whether failures 
to report or return have properly been categorized by this and most other courts as crimes of 
violence”). 
 72. Id. 
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The Supreme Court shared the Seventh Circuit’s concern and held 
that failure-to-report escapes should be treated differently than 
custodial escapes because noncustodial escapes do not involve the 
level of risk required to qualify as a violent felony.73 According to the 
Court, the Illinois escape statute for ACCA purposes should be 
treated “as containing at least two separate crimes, namely escape 
from custody on the one hand, and a failure to report on the other.”74 
Essentially, the Court upheld the categorical approach, which 
examines the generic crime of escape, as the correct test for 
determining whether a crime is a violent felony.75 However, the Court 
used statistical analysis in the United States Sentencing Commission 
report showing that noncustodial escapes are not dangerous “powder 
kegs” to hold that custodial and noncustodial escapes should be 
treated as two different crimes, with the latter constituting a separate 
category of nonviolent crimes.76 
V.  ANALYSIS 
Although the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Chambers 
followed its circuit precedents by holding that a noncustodial escape 
constituted a violent felony, it raised important concerns regarding the 
application of the categorical approach by casting doubt on its prior 
decisions. Its holding in Chambers tracks the United States v. Golden 
and United States v. Bryant opinions, both of which applied the 
categorical approach to hold that every escape categorically qualified 
as a violent felony because of the inherent risk of serious injury to 
another person. But, despite its adherence to precedent, the 
Chambers court explained why the categorical analysis is problematic. 
Although the court did not go so far as to question the legitimacy 
of the categorical approach, it was disturbed by how the prior cases 
essentially based their categorical analyses on mere speculations 
about the physical risk to others allegedly inherent with any type of 
escape.77 The court worried that the categorical approach’s scope 
might include crimes that pose no serious risk of physical injury to 
 
 73. United States v. Chambers (Chambers III), 129 S. Ct. 687, 691 (2009). 
 74. Id. (emphasis added). 
 75. See generally id. at 690. 
 76. See generally id. at 692–93. 
 77. See United States v. Chambers (Chambers I), 473 F.3d 724, 726 (7th Cir. 2007) (stating 
that “it is an embarrassment to the law when judges base decisions of consequence on 
conjectures”). 
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another,78 a concern obviously implicated by the classification of a 
failure-to-report escape as a violent felony.79 Thus, the court criticized 
United States v. Gosling’s description of “every escape scenario” being 
“powder keg” having the serious potential to explode into violence as 
being too speculative to justify categorizing noncustodial escapes as 
violent felonies.80 
This criticism resonated with the D.C. Circuit’s disapproval of the 
categorical approach. The D.C. Circuit seemed to fear that the 
categorical approach potentially allows courts to classify any felony as 
violent under the ACCA: if the “recapture of an escapee inherently 
contains a risk of violent encounter between the escapee and the 
arresting officers”81 that makes noncustodial escape a violent felony, 
“the same is true as to the capture of any lawbreaker.”82 In other 
words, courts can describe virtually any felony as a “powder keg” to 
impose the harsh penalties of the ACCA. For this particular reason, 
the D.C. Circuit was “reluctant to adopt the categorical approach,”83 
and the Seventh Circuit in Chambers recommended requiring courts 
to base their categorical analyses on research rather than 
speculation.84 
The Seventh Circuit raised important policy implications for the 
Supreme Court to consider. First, if the Supreme Court had ruled 
against Chambers, courts would be free to categorize virtually any 
felony as violent under the ACCA based on conjectures and 
speculations. On the other hand, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
favor of Chambers could have significantly narrowed the scope of 
what constitutes a violent felony under the ACCA, limiting courts’ 
discretion in their categorical analyses. This risked creating difficult 
line-drawing problems by forcing the courts essentially to conduct 
case-by-case examinations, thereby “destroy[ing] the whole benefit of 
 
 78. See id. (holding that although the court adheres to the precedents, “it is an 
embarrassment to the law” to base decisions “on conjectures, in this case a conjecture as to the 
possible danger of physical injury posed by criminals who . . . fail to return”). 
 79. See id. at 726–27 (asserting that United States v. Gosling, 39 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 1994), 
should not be treated as authoritative in a case involving a noncustodial escape, and concluding 
that “if courts insist on lumping all escapes together in determining whether escape is a crime of 
violence, the enormous preponderance of walkaways could well compel a conclusion that 
escape is never a crime of violence”). 
 80. Id. 
 81. United States v. Thomas, 333 F.3d 280, 282 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Chambers I, 473 F.3d at 727. 
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the categorical approach.”85 Although it might be easy to carve out 
noncustodial escapes as a separate category of nonviolent crimes, it is 
not be so obvious in which categories other types of crimes fall under 
the ACCA. 
Although the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Chambers and thus 
limited courts’ discretion in their categorical analyses, it sought to 
preserve the merits of the categorical approach by adopting the 
Seventh Circuit’s advice: courts must base their categorical risk 
analysis on studies and research that empirically show the level of 
physical risk presented by an act if that act is to be considered a 
violent crime for sentencing enhancements.86 This procedure not only 
limits the scope of what constitutes a violent felony under the ACCA, 
but also resolves difficult line-drawing problems. The discretion of the 
courts is replaced by hard figures, providing greater legitimacy and 
consistency to courts’ categorization of crimes for purposes of 
sentencing enhancement. 
The Supreme Court’s decision raises other concerns though. As 
the Seventh Circuit in Chambers warned, a court might simply lack 
sufficient data to determine the proper categorization of a crime.87 
Even if a court were to conduct research or wait for the studies to 
come out, should it then postpone its decision? Is it realistic for 
studies to be done on every crime? Requiring courts to base the 
categorical analysis on studies might stymie the sentencing 
enhancement process and hurt the ACCA’s fundamental purpose of 
getting violent, recidivist criminals off the street. The Supreme Court, 
unfortunately, failed to address these questions in Chambers. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Chambers by holding that a 
failure-to-report escape does not present the serious potential risk of 
physical injury to another sufficient for it to constitute a violent 
felony under the ACCA. The Court reconsidered the categorical 
approach as applied by the majority of the circuits and supported the 
use of statistics by courts in their categorical analyses. The decision 
 
 85. Transcript of Oral Argument at *8, Chambers v. United States, 2008 WL 4892841 
(U.S.) (No. 06-11206). 
 86. Chambers I, 473 F.3d at 727. 
 87. See id. at 727 (indicating that “more research will be needed to establish whether 
failures to report or return have properly been categorized”). 
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will significantly influence how the lower courts apply the categorical 
approach, but only time will tell how the courts implement the 
Supreme Court’s decision. 
 
